JUDGEMENTS
| CIVIL MATTER | ||||
TOPIC | TITLE | YEAR | DETAILS | LINK |
| GPA VALIDITY | Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. VS State of Haryana & Anr. | 2011 | Immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred only by registered deed like sale, gift conveyance etc., Transaction i.e., execution of GPA / SPA / WILL etc., in respect of immovable property, do not convey any title, and thus, are not legally recognised valid modes of transfer of immovable property. | Judgement Circular -1 Circular -2 |
When to file
| Anathulla Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy & Ors | 2008 | Para 11.1- When a Plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of a property and such possession is disturbed or threatened by the defendant, a suit for injunction simpliciter will lie. A person has a right to pro | |
| Guidelines to issue MANDATORY INJUNCTION | Dorab Cawasji Warden vs Coomi Sorab Warden & Ors on 13 February, 1990 SC | 1990 | Grant of interim mandatory injunction in suit-Court to keep in mind restriction on right of transferee to joint possession | Judgement |
| Doctrine of LIS PENDENCE | Shingara Singh vs Daljit Singh | 2024 | The doctrine of lis pendens as contained in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to a transaction during pendency of the suit... The plaintiff was non-suited only on the ground that defendant no. 2 had no notice of the agreement and is a bona fide purchaser. However, once sale agreement is proved and the subsequent sale was during pendency of the suit hit by the doctrine of lis pendens, the High Court was fully justified in setting aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court | Judgement |
| CIVIL | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| CIVIL | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| CRIMINAL MATTER | ||||
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Compoundable Offences under CrPC 320 | Mahalovya Gauba v. State of Punjab and Another | 2021 | that criminal proceedings involving compoundable offences can be divided into two categories: 1) Settlement without Court Consent – Under Section 320(1) of the CrPC, criminal offences can be settled without requiring the court’s consent. 2) Settlement with Court Consent – Under Section 320(2) of the CrPC, certain criminal proceedings can be settled with the court’s approval. The Lok Adalat is empowered to handle compoundable criminal cases falling into both of these categories, those which can be settled without the court’s consent (Section 320(1)) and those that require the court’s consent (Section 320(2)). While Section 320(1) of the CrPC doesn’t explicitly state that compounding can only occur after filing a case under Section 173(2) of the CrPC and not before, the wording in Section 320(2) seems to suggest the same. The question arises whether, during the investigative stage, compoundable criminal cases can be settled before the submission of a case file under Section 173(2) of the CrPC. | Judgement |
| One Surety in more cases (Sec 441A CrPC) | Tabassum Parveen vs State Of U.P | 2021 | "Declaration by sureties- Every person standing surety to an accused person for his release on bail, shall make a declaration before the Court as to the number of persons to whom he has stood surety including the accused, giving therein all the relevant particulars." | |
| Offence u/s 182 IPC is void ab initio if there is no written complaint (Sec 172 - 188 IPC) | Saloni Arora v. State of NCT of Delhi | 2017 | law laid down by this Court in the case of Daulat Ram vs. State of Punjab, (AIR 1962 SC 1206) that in order to prosecute an accused for an offence punishable under Section 182 IPC, it is mandatory to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 195 of the Code else such action is rendered void ab initio. | Judgement |
| Part / Partial Quashing of FIR (482 CrPC) Partial / Part FIR Quashing can be done | Sunil Tomar vs The State of NCT of Delhi & Onr. -[High Court of Delhi] | 2022 | Part / Partial FIR Quashing is allowed | judgement |
| Part / Partial Quashing of FIR (482 CrPC) Partial / Part FIR Quashing can be done | Lovely Salhotra and Anr. vs. State, NCT of Delhi (2017 SCC Online SC 636), SUPREME COURT OF INIDA | 2017 | The High Court was wrong in holding that the F.I.R. cannot be quashed in part and it ought to have appreciated the fact that the appellants-herein cannot be allowed to suffer on the basis of the complaint filed by Respondent No.2— herein only on the ground that the investigation against co accused is still pending. | Judgement |
| Guidelines by SC court in releasing articles and vehicles in the custody of police | Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat | 2002 | Whether there is proper implementation of rules regarding the handling of property in police custody as given under Section 451 and 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter mentioned as “CrPC”) Whether valuable property and articles should be detained in police custody beyond necessity. Whether the custody of seized articles should be with the police or the person entitled to their possession | Judgement |
| 'Torture' is not part of Police's Official Duty, No Sanction from State Govt required under CrPC 197 (1) for taking cognisance | C. Alavi vs State of Kerala | 2024 | Accused was police officer tortured the complainant in the police station "The fundamental test appears to be that the accused can reasonably claim that what he did was by virtue of his office. The accused/revision petitioner cannot claim that what he did was by virtue of his office. It is the quality of the act that is important. The alleged acts, at any rate, would not fall within the scope and range of his official duties. Therefore, he is not entitled to the protection contemplated under Section 197 Cr.PC." | Judgement |
Dowry Demand Not Required for Section 498A IPC Offense if Physical or Mental Cruelty to Wife is Proven | ALURI VENKATA RAMANA Vs. ALURI THIRUPATHI RAO & ORS. | 2025 | The allegations made by the Appellant, which detail instances of physical abuse and harassment, fall within the scope of "cruelty" as defined under clause (a) of Section 498A IPC. The absence of an explicit dowry demand does not negate the applicability of the provision where acts of physical violence and mental distress have been demonstrated. The core of the offence under Section 498A IPC lies in the act of cruelty and does not purely revolve around the demand for dowry | Judgement |
| 2002 | Judgement | |||
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| FAMILY MATTERS | ||||
TOPIC | TITLE | YEAR | DETAILS | LINK |
| Waving off mandatory cooling period in Mutual Divorce Cases | Amardeep Singh v. Harveen Kaur | 2017 | The period under Section 13B(1) is merely directory, and not mandatory | Judgement |
| Waving off mandatory cooling period in Mutual Divorce Cases | Sankalp Singh v. Prarthana Chandra | 2013 | That the period of one year stipulated in Section 13B(1) may be waived provided a case of "exceptional hardship" or "exceptional depravity" is made out before the court | LINK |
| Whether denial of Sex can qualify as "exceptional depravity" under S. 14 of HMA and allow waver of one year mandatory period? | Rishu Aggarwal v. Mohit Goyal | 2022 | High Court held that denial of cohabitation in a marriage cannot be regarded as "exceptional hardship" or "exceptional depravity", it could not call for waiver of a mandatory period of one year which is to be waived as matter of exception, and not a matter of rule. Additionally the court remarked that denial od conjugal relationship, or non-consummation due to temperamental/behavioural differences can only be a ground for divorce, under cruelty | LINK |
| 2 years of separation under Indian Divorce Act is reduced to 1 year | Saumya Ann Thomas vs The Union Oof India | 2010 | The stipulation in Sec.10A(1) of the Divorce Act that the spouses must "have been living separately for a period of two years or more" is declared to be unconstitutional as the stipulation of the period of "two years" therein violates the fundamental rights to equality and the right to life under Arts.14 and 21 of the Constitution | Judgement |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
| FAMILY | CASE TITLE | 222 | BAIL BOOND | LINK |
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| NI ACT MATTERS | ||||
TOPIC |
TITLE | YEAR |
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Not only fund insufficient reasons other reasons also and Security Cheque also attract 138 |
PAYAL MALHOTRA VS. SULEKH CHAND |
2023 |
Not only the cases of dishonour of cheques on account of insufficient funds or exceeding of arrangement but the cases involving dishonour of cheques on accounts of “payment stopped” and “account closed” have also been brought within the ambit of offence under the aforesaid provision. |
Judgement |
| Claim amount in the cheque and other charges should be mentioned as separate in Legal Notice u/s 138 | Suman Sethi v. Ajay K. Churiwal and another | 2000 | In the notice in question the "said amount" i.e. the cheque amount has been dearly stated. Respondent No. 1 had claimed in additional to the cheque amount, incidental charges and notice charge. These two amounts are severable. In the notice it was clearly stated that on failure to comply with the demand necessary legal steps will be taken up. If respondent No. 1 had paid the cheque amount he would have been absolved from the criminal liability under Section 138. Regarding other claims, a civil suit would be necessary We, therefore, do not Find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly it is dismissed | Judgement |
| Partner of partnership firm filing 138 compliant | M/S New Kruba Jeweller Vs. V.Kanchana | 2016 | Under Sec 25 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932, if a partner files a complaint on behalf of the firm, the firm and other partners are bound by the Act. | Judgement |
| Cheque Amount can't be more than actual claim | Dasharatbhai Trikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendra Bhai Patel | 2022 | Accused has made part-payments and the claim should be on balance payment / pending payment and the Cheque amount can't be more than 'Legally enforceable Debt" | Judgement |
| Validity of Security Cheque | Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao v. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited | 2016 | The previous judgement in Indus Airways Private Limited v. Magnum Aviation Private Limited, Security cheques were given against purchase order which was later cancelled by the purchaser and requested to return the security cheque but the seller filed case under Ni Act S. 138, which was not against a legally enforceable debt, because no purchase were made in Sampelly security cheques were given against loan EMI and security cheque dishonoured against default in instalment will attract NI Act 138 | Judgement |
| Examination of Handwriting in cheque | Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Prabhodh Kumar Tewari | 2022 | Considering previous judgements in...
A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability. It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted. If a signed blank cheque is voluntarily presented to a payee, towards some payment, the payee may fill up the amount and other particulars. This in itself would not invalidate the cheque. The onus would still be on the accused to prove that the cheque was not in discharge of a debt or liability by adducing evidence. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt. | Judgement |
| Validity of Service of Legal Notice through Courier & WhatsApp | Rajiv Malhotra vs State Of U.P. And Another | 2024 |
13. So far as the third question, whether the written notice through courier service is valid notice under Section 138 N.I. Act is concerned, for deciding this question, it is necessary to consider Section 138 N.I. Act which provides the requirement of giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque on bouncing of the same, but this section does not provide the mode of sending notice. However, Section 94 of the N.I. Act provides that notice, on dishonouring of the cheque, can be given orally or in writing with a further condition that if it is given in writing, then it may be sent by post. Section 138 and 94 of the N.I. Act is quoted as under:- | Judgement |
Invalid Cheques do not Attract Liability Under Section 138 of NI Act | ARCHANA SINGH GAUTAM Vs. STATE OF U.P (Allahabad HC) | 2024 | Cheques that are invalid due to institutional changes such as mergers do not attract liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. | Judgement |
| NI Act complaint will lie even if cheque bounce was due to account freezing | Sheikh Owais Tariq vs Satvir singh | 2024 | We find ourselves in respectful agreement with the decision in Magma case that the expression “amount of money … is insufficient” appearing in Section 138 of the Act is a genus and dishonour for reasons such “as account closed”, “payment stopped”, “referred to the drawer” are only species of that genus. Just as dishonour of a cheque on the ground that the account has been closed is a dishonour falling in the first contingency referred to in Section 138, so also dishonour on the ground that the “signatures do not match” or that the “image is not found”, which too implies that the specimen signatures do not match the signatures on the cheque would constitute a dishonour within the meaning of Section 138 of the Act: | Judgement |
S. 143-A NI Act| Factors laid down by SC for exercising discretion in payment of interim compensation in cheque dishonour cases | Rakesh Ranjan Shrivastava v. State of Jharkhand (SC) | 2024 | if the word ‘may’ is read as ‘shall’, it will have drastic consequences, as in every complaint under Section 138, the accused will have to pay interim compensation up to 20 per cent of the cheque amount and such an interpretation will be unjust and contrary to the well-settled concept of fairness and justice, exposing the provision to the vice of manifest arbitrariness. Therefore, the Court held that the power under Section 143-A (1) is discretionary and not mandatory | Judgement ------------- other judgements |
